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ABSTRACT
The U.S. and international aviation communities have adopted the Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) process for defining aircraft performance when operating in the en-route,
approach and landing phases of flight. RNP consists primarily of the following key parameters -
accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability. The processes and analytical techniques employed
to define en-route, approach and landing RNP have been applied in the development of RNP for
the airport surface.
The development of airport surface RNP began with the classification of the various phases of
aircraft operations on airport surface areas. All aspects of an aircraft's movement on the airport
surface were examined - exiting the runway, normal taxi, and apron taxi. Additional variables
defined within these operational phases are aircraft taxi speeds, exposure times to the various
phases of taxiing, and visibility conditions on the airport surface. A surface movement Target
Level of Safety (TLS) was established, followed by an allocation of risks to each phase of surface
movement. Other factors considered in the determination of the airport surface RNP include the
reaction of the pilot to various navigation system failures and containment limits imposed on the
aircrai_ when operating within the confines of the airport environment. The result is a set of
proposed requirements for accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability for each phase of
surface movement.
To validate the proposed RNP requirements several methods were used. Operational and flight
demonstration data were analyzed for conformance with proposed requirements, as were several
aircraft flight simulation studies. The pilot failure risk component was analyzed through several
hypothetical scenarios. Additional simulator studies are recommended to better quantify crew
reactions to failures as well as additional simulator and field testing to validate achieved accuracy
performance.
This research was performed in support of the NASA Low Visibility Landing and Surface
Operations Program.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
One of the anticipated applications of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), including the
Global Positioning System (GPS), is aircraft navigation on the airport surface. With the
implementation of local area differential GNSS, technology will be available to enable aircraft to
obtain accurate position information when taxiing on the airport. Currently, navigation
performance standards do not exist for aircraft operations on the airport surface. Standards are
under development by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) All Weather
Operations Panel (AWOP) for Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-
SMGCS) and by the RTCA Airport Surface Navigation and Surveillance subgroup of Special
Committee 159. Under contract to NASA Langley Research Center as part of the Terminal Area
Productivity Program, Rannoch is developing the Required Navigation Performance (RNP)
requirements for surface movement navigation.
This report presents a summary of RNP development, including definition of the operation Target
Level of Safety (TLS) and proposed requirements for the four RNP parameters-integrity,
continuity, accuracy and availability. In addition to definition of system level requirements, the
report presents proposed allocations for navigation sensor performance, which defines the
performance needed by a GNSS-based system to satisfy system RNP requirements.
RNP is a relatively new concept that is being applied to develop navigation standards for all
phases ofaircratt operations, including en route, landing and surface operations. See references 1
and 2 for a description of RNP for approach and landing and references 3 and 4 as it pertains to
the en route phase of flight. RNP is a probabilistic approach to evaluating an aircraft's deviation
from its intended course. One of the benefits of the RNP approach is that it allows the design
engineer to trade off elements of error budgets between subsystems. For example, a newer
autopilot design may allow the use of a less accurate sensor or ground system. The RNP
approach also goes beyond the accuracy of a system and provides quantitative requirements for a
system's continuity and integrity. In this report the RNP process is applied to aircraft surface
movements. The main components of RNP as developed for this application are:
• RNP Parameter Definition
• Operation Classification
• Target Level of Safety Risk Allocation
• Accident/Incident Ratio
• Risk Allocations
• Pilot Risk Factor
• Integrity and Continuity
• Containment Limit
• Accuracy
• Availability
• Validation
Each of these are discussed in the following sections.
2.0 REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 RNP Parameter Definitions
2.1.1 Required Navigation Performance (RNP)
RNP is a statement of the navigation performance accuracy necessary for operation within a
defined airspace [3 ]. There are four primary parameters used to define RNP - accuracy, integrity,
continuity and availability. The definitions given below are based on those used for other phases
of flight [1,3]. However, they have been tailored for application to airport surface movement. As
applied here the terms navigation and guidance have the same meaning.
2.1.2 Accuracy
Accuracy is defined in terms of the Total System Error (TSE) as the difference between the true
position and the desired position. The accuracy requirement is for the TSE to remain within a
normal performance region, under fault-free conditions, 95% of the time [5].
2.1.3 Integrity
Integrity relates to the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the navigation information
supplied by the navigation system. Integrity includes the ability of the navigation system to
provide timely and valid alerts to the user when the system must not be used for the intended
operation. Integrity risk is the probability of an undetected failure that results in the TSE
exceeding the Containment Limit (CL) [5].
2.1.4 Continuity
Navigation continuity is the capability of the navigation system (comprising all elements necessary
to maintain aircraft position within the containment region) to perform the navigation function
without unscheduled interruption during the intended operation. Continuity risk is the probability
that the system will be interrupted and not provide navigation information over the period of the
intended operation. More specifically, continuity is the probability that the system will be
available for the duration of an operation, presuming that the system was available at the
beginning of the operation [5].
2.1.5 Availability
Availability is an indication of the ability of the navigation function to provide usable service
within the specified coverage area, and is defined as the portion of time during which the system is
to be used for navigation, during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew,
autopilot, or other system managing the movement of the aircraft. Availability is specified in
terms of the probability of the navigation function being available at the beginning of the intended
operation [5].
2.2 Operation Classification
The surface operation is considered in phases, including rollout, high speed taxi exit, and normal
taxi. The definition of phases is related to aircraft taxi speed and each phase of the operation is
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consideredfor differentvisibility conditions.Figure1showsa summaryof thephasesof
operationselectedfor surfacemovement.
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Figure 1. Phases of Surface Operation
Rollout is defined as touchdown to the point where the aircraft decelerates below 60 kts [1].
Operationally, rollout is considered to be a part of the aircraft landing, therefore the RNP for that
phase of surface movement is defined by the Category III landing RNP. After completing rollout
the aircraft will enter into the taxi phase, which is defined as either high speed, normal or apron
taxi. For runways with a rapid exit taxiway (also referred to as a high speed exit), the aircraft will
end rollout by taxiing at a high speed. After the aircraft has decelerated it enters the normal taxi
phase. The aircraft then enters the apron area and initially will travel on an apron taxiway. When
the aircraft enters the stand area it will be moving on a stand taxilane at its slowest taxi speed. In
some operations there is also a docking maneuver.
For the departing aircraft, the order of the phases of operation is from the stand to normal/apron
taxi to takeoff roll. The takeoff roll is covered in the RNP for aircraft departure and is therefore
not included as part of the surface movement RNP. High speed taxi is normally at speeds
between 30 and 70 kts, which occur with the use of rapid exits. This is based on measurements of
operational speeds [6, Appendix A] and the need to limit lateral acceleration [7]. The study in
reference 7 defined a requirement to limit the lateral acceleration to 0.15 g, which results in a
maximum exit velocity of 70 kts. It should also be noted that the ICAO aerodrome design manual
assumes a velocity of 50 kts for rapid exit taxiways [8]. However, operational data [6] shows
instances of higher velocities, which should be accommodated in the analysis. Normal/apron
taxiway speeds range from 10 - 50 kts. The 50 kts maximum for normal taxi is based upon a
U.K. study that found maximum speeds on straight sections as high as 49 kts, with the average
being slightly under 20 kts [6]. Speeds are reduced during turns, therefore the range is reduced to
a maximum of 20 kts. When the aircraft enters the stand taxilane phase of surface movement it
will have a ground speed between 0 and 10 kts. To determine the risk for each phase of
operation, an associated exposure time must be assigned. Exposure times were determined by
evaluating typical taxi distances for each phase for nine major U.S. airports [9, Appendix B].
Table 1 summarizes the velocities and exposure times for the different phases.
Table 1. )osure Times
Taxi Phase
Rapid Exit
Speed)
Normal/Apron
Taxiway - straight
Normal/Apron
Taxiway - 90° turn
Stand/
Stand Taxilane
Taxi Speeds and Ex
Taxi
Speed
(knots)
30-70
10-50
10-20
0-10
Exposure
Time
(minutes)
0.5
As stated earlier, each phase of the surface operation must be considered for different visibility
conditions. Currently, visibility conditions have four classifications according to ICAO [5] and
are defined below. Conditions 3 and 4 are essentially equivalent to approach and landing
Category III.
Visibility Condition 1: Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other
traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference, and for personnel of control units to
exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance (RVR > 400 m/1300 fi).
Visibility Condition 2: Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other
traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference, but insufficient for personnel of control
units to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance (RVR > 400 m/1300 ft).
Visibility Condition 3: Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi but insufficient for the pilot to
avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways and at intersection by visual reference with other
traffic, and insufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control over all traffic on the
basis of visual surveillance (75 m/250 fi < RVR < 400 rrdl300 ft).
Visibility Condition 4: Visibility insufficient for the pilot to taxi by visual guidance only (RVR <
75 m/250 ft).
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For the purposes of this report, Visibility Conditions 1 and 2 were treated as a single category
(referred to as Visibility Condition 1,2) because these conditions are identical from the crew's
perspective.
2.3 TLS Risk Allocation
The target level of safety established by ICAO for the entire operation or mission is one accident
per 10 7 operations [5]. It is necessary to allocate a portion of this to the taxi phase. One method
of determining an appropriate TLS for an operation is to base it upon the historical accident rate.
Two sources of accident data are used here-worldwide data, and National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) data for aircraft operations in the U.S. Worldwide accident data reveals the
following:
• Overall fatal accident rate (1985-94) = 1.8 x 10 -6 per operation [ 10,11 ]
• Taxi accidents (including load and unload) account for 5% of fatal accidents [12]
• Therefore, the fatal taxi accident rate = 9.0 x 10 -8 per operation.
NTSB accident data for the U.S. is summarized as follows:
• Overall fatal accident rate (1985-94) = 0.56 x 10-6 per operation [13]
• Fatal taxi accidents account for 11% of all fatal accidents [13]
• Therefore, the fatal taxi accident rate = 6.2 x 10.8 per operation.
The ICAO and NTSB fatal taxi accident rates are similar (9.0 vs. 6.2 x 10 s per operation). The
final approach and landing phase was allocated 1.0 x 10 s [1,2]. Similarly, the other phases of
flight have allocations that use only a small portion of the overall TLS. Therefore, the taxi phase
should be allocated a comparable portion. Based on the above, the surface movement TLS was
established at 1.0 x 10"s fatal taxi accidents per operation. This provides a margin of 6-9 over the
historical accident rate and is in line with the allocations used for the approach and landing RNP.
It should be noted that this TLS applies to all visibility conditions of surface operations. Figure 2
shows the allocation of risk from the TLS to integrity and continuity requirements for the
guidance function. The TLS is initially divided between the four functions associated with surface
movement (surveillance, guidance, control and routing). Risks were divided equally except for
routing, which was assigned a lower risk because it is a less complex function. Following is an
explanation of the allocation process for the guidance (or navigation) risk.
2.4 Accident incident Ratio
Since not all incidents translate to accidents, there is a ratio assigned. An incident is defined as
any time the aircraft leaves the containment region (to be defined later). There are actually two
ratios used - fatal accident/accident and accident/incident. These ratios were based primarily on
NTSB data for accidents on the airport surface.
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Figure 2. RNP Risk Allocation
2.5 Risk Allocations
The overall TLS is allocated to each phase of the surface operation. The TLS includes all phases
of an operation, so for the surface, both departure and arrival must be included. Risk levels are
assigned to each phase-high speed taxi, normal taxi, etc. Failures are identified as continuity or
integrity. The reason for different allocations is different exposure times. The values shown in
Figure 2 are on a per operation basis. The requirements have been allocated such that when
normalized to a per hour basis they are roughly equal over all phases of the operation and are
shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Allocation of Integrity and Continuity Risk
Visibility Phase Failure RNP Pilot Failure RNP Exposure Risk [ICondition Mode Risk Risk Allocation Time (per hour)
6
(Minutes)
1,2 Stand Taxilane Continuity 7.50E-09 5.0E-06 1.5E-03 3.0 3.00E-02
Stand Taxilane Integrity 7.50E-09 5.0E-05 1.5E-04 3.0 3.00E-03
Normal/Apron Continuity 3.00E-08 1.0E-04 3.0E-04 6.0 "3.00E-03
Normal/Apron Integrity 3.00E-08 1.0E-04 3.0E-04 6.0 3.00E-03
High Speed Continuity 5.00E-09 1.0E-04 5.0E-05 0.5 6.00E-03
High Speed Integrity 5.00E-09 3.0E-03 1.7E-06 0.5 "2.00E-04
3 Stand Taxilane Continuity 7.50E-09 5.0E-05 1.5E-04 3.0 3.00E-03
Stand Taxilane Integrity 7.50E-09 5.0E-03 1.5E-06 3.0 3.00E-05
Normal/Apron Continuity 3.00E-08 1.0E-04 1.5E-04 6.0 "3.00E-03
Normal/Apron Integrity 3.00E-08 1.0E-02 3.0E-06 6.0 "3.00E-05
High Speed Continuity 5.00E-09 1.0E-04 1.3E-05 0.5 6.00E-03
High Speed Integrity 5.00E-09 1.5E-02 3.3E-07 0.5 4.00E-05
4 Stand Taxilane Continuity 7.50E-09 1.0E-04 1.5E-05 3.0 *1.50E-03
Stand Taxilane Integrity 7.50E-09 5.0E-02 1.5E-07 3.0 3.00E-06
Normal/Apron Continuity 3.00E-08 1.0E-04 3.0E-05 6.0 3.00E-03
Normal/Apron Integrity 3.00E-08 1.0E-01 3.0E-07 6.0 "3.00E-06
High Speed Continuity 5.00E-09 1.0E-04 2.5E-06 0.5 6.00E-03
High Speed Integrity 5.0E-09 1.0E-01 5.0E-08 0.5 6.00E-06
* Most stringent requirements for that visibility condition.
2.6 Pilot Risk Factor
Figure 3 shows the pilot failure risk factors assigned for various failure modes and visibility
conditions at stand taxilane, normal/apron and high speed taxi aircraft movements. The risk
factor is dependent on several variables, all of which affect the probability of an incident. The
mode of failure determines whether the crew receives a warning that a failure has occurred. If a
continuity failure occurs, the crew will receive a warning immediately following the failure. An
integrity failure will yield no warning, therefore the crew will depend on visual cues to recognize
that a failure has occurred. Consequently, longer response times can be expected for integrity
failures. Since the crew relies on visual, out-the-window views, visibility will primarily drive pilot
risk for the integrity failure mode. For example, low visibility can be expected to generate longer
pilot response times and higher risk. Aircraft velocity affects the amount of time the crew has to
respond to a failure. The greater the aircraft velocity, the longer the braking distance, and
consequently the less time the crew has to respond to the failure. Crew response time will also be
longer because of an increased crew workload when traveling at high speeds on the airport
surface (i.e., high speed exit taxiing). See 3.4.1 for a complete discussion of the validation of the
pilot risk factor values.
100E-06
l .OOE-05
100E.-04
i iO_)E-03
100E-02
190E-OI
100E+O0
2.7 Integrity and Continuity Requirements
The RNP risk allocation is equally divided between integrity and continuity (Figure 2). Table 2
lists the allocations for all cases. Table 3 summarizes the most stringent integrity and continuity
requirements for different visibility conditions. Each phase of surface operation is theoretically
allocated a different risk, but in order to simplify the standards only the most stringent values are
recommended as the requirement.
Table 3. Integrity and Continui_ Risk _per hour
Visibility Condition
1,7. 3 4
Inte_ity 2.0 x 10 -4 3.0 x '10 "s 3.0 x 10 .6
Continuity 3.0 x 10 .3 3.0 x 10 .3 1.5 x 10 .3
2.8 Containment LimR
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate key taxiway design standards [8,14, 15]. The two parameters of
concern are the relationship of the main wheels to the edge of the taxiway and its shoulder, and
the margin between the wing tips and the closest allowable objects. Figure 4 shows straight
sections oftaxiways and Figure 5 curved sections.
.... -t inimum .........
Taxiway Width -'7
'_ _---- Taxiway Shoulder l
Figure 4. Taxiway Design Standards (straight segments)
The difference with curved sections is that normally there is additional pavement added to the
inside of the curve in the form of a fillet. This compensates for the fuselage of the aircraft
deviating to the inside when making a turn, assuming that the pilot steers by maintaining the
cockpit (and nosewheel) over the centerline of the taxiway. The amount of extra fillet required is
sufficient to maintain the same margins between the wheels and taxiway edge. At airports where
there is no fillet the pilot is required to use "judgmental oversteering" to maneuver the aircraft,
where the nosewheel is purposely steered outside the centerline, thus keeping the fuselage from
deviating to the inside of the curve.
Fillet
Fillet Radius for /
Tracking Centerline-"-_ "_'_i -"
:_,_2._-"'"_"" _'%_ _'_,"_:_ "_"
_ Taxiway Shoulder
Figure 5. Taxiway Design Standards (curved segments)
The Containment Limit definition assumes operation at an aerodrome that meets taxiway widths
and the minimum separation distances specified in ICAO Annex 14 [ 14]. Table 4 indicates the
taxiway widths categorized according to aerodrome code. Codes D and E are designed to handle
widebody commercial aircraft (B-747, DC-10), code C corresponds to midsize aircraft (B-737,
9
DC-9), andcodesA and B relate to general aviation aircraft. For code E, there is a 15.5 m
margin between the wing tips and any objects, including wings of aircraft on parallel taxiways.
The minimum margin between the main wheels and taxiway edge is 4.5 m. The standards also
recommend a 10.5 m shoulder, thus yielding a 15 m margin between the wheels and outer edge of
the shoulder. The result is that the aircraft can deviate by 15 m from the taxiway centerline before
there is risk of an incident, and therefore the CL is defined to be this value. For the purposes of
this report, it is assumed that all deviations are referenced to the nosewheel of the aircraft.
Talde 4. Minimum Se
Aerodrome
reference
code letter
mration Distances for Different Taxiway Aerodrome Codes
Margin Distance Wing tip to Wing tip Wing tip
between
main gear
and taxiway
edge
(meters)
1.5
Maximum
Taxiway outer main
width gear wheel
(meters) span
(meters)
7.5 4.3
10.5 6.0
18 9.0
15 6.0
23 14.0
18 9.0
23 14.0
between
centerline
and object
(meters)
16.25
Maximum
wing span
(meters)
15
object
margin -
taxiways
(meters)
A 8.75
B 2.25 21.5 24 9.5
C 4.5 26.0 36 8.0
C 3.0 26.0 36 8.0
D 4.5 40.5 52 14.5
D 4.5 40.5 52 14.5
E 4.5 6547.5 15.0
to object to object
margin - margin -
stand stand
taxilane (meters)
(meters)
4.5 3.0
4.5 3.0
6.5 4.5
6.5 4.5
10.0 7.5
10.0 7.5
10.0 7.5
Note: Based on ICAO Aerodrome Design Manual, Part 2, Taxiways, Aprons and Holding Bays [81.
Table 5 lists the CL values based on minimum separation distances for aircraft for all taxiway
design codes. The CL of 15 m is applicable only to codes D and E. Since the margin is less for
codes A, B and C, the CL for those cases is defined accordingly as 8 m. In the stand taxilanes,
the boundary is dependent on the minimum clearance between the aircraft's wing tips and other
objects. In the stand area, the relationship of the main wheels to the edge of the taxilane is not of
concern because there is a continuous pavement area; therefore, only the wing tip margins
determine the CL. As would be expected, the safety margins and associated CLs decrease in the
stand areas since it is assumed the aircraft is moving slower and is able to track the centerline
more accurately. The probability of an aircraft deviating outside the boundary of the containment
region is equal to the incident risk for the appropriate surface operation. These are indicated in
Figure 2, and are either 1.5 x 10 s (high speed taxi and stand/stand taxilane) or 6.0 x 10 s (normal
and apron taxi).
Aerodrome
Code
Table 5. Containment Limit Requirements
Taxiways Stand Taxilanes
Containment
Limit (meters)
8
Stand
Containment Limit
(meters)
4.5A
B 8 4.5 3.0
C 8 6.5 4.5
D 15 10 7.5
E 15 10 7.5
Containment Limit
(meters)
3.0
Note: Aerodrome reference code is according to the code letter definition in Annex 14, paragraph 1.3 [14].
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2.9 Accuracy
2.9.1 Derivation of Total System Error
The accuracy requirement establishes normal performance or 95% TSE, defined as the difference
between actual aircraft position and the desired path (see Figure 6).
Desired Path
PathDefinition Error
_t
Defined Path
Path Steering Error
Total System Error
_ Position EstimationError
Estimated Position
Actual Position
Figure 6. Components of Total System Error
The constraining limit used in establishing the accuracy requirement is the margin between the
aircraft wheels and taxiway edge (4.5 m for codes D and E). The normal performance limit
should be established to minimize the probability of the wheels leaving the taxiway. The
probability allocated is the equivalent of 4a or 6.3 x 10 s, based on the assumption that the TSE
distribution is gaussian. Defining the deviation to the taxiway edge as a 4a value and the normal
performance as 2a (approximately 95%), the accuracy requirement is obtained by dividing the
wheel margin by two. For aircraft with 4.5 m wheel margins the resulting accuracy requirement is
+ 2.2 m. The resulting TSE requirements for all cases are given in Table 6.
Table 6. Normal Performance Requirements
95% total system error (meters)
Aerodrome
Code
A
B
c
c
Taxiway
Width
(meters)
7.5
10.5
15
Taxiways
0.7
1.I
1.5
Stand
taxilanes
0.7
0.7
1.0
18 2.2 1.0
D 18 2.2 1.2
D 23 2.2 1.2
E 23 2.2 1.2
Stand
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
1.0
1.0
1.0
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Theprocessfor establishingtheTSE limit isanalogousto that usedinestablishingtherelationship
betweenthe95%TSEandtheCL for otherRNPapplications.Foren routeandterminalarea
navigationthecontainmentlimit is setto two timesthe95%value[3], while for approachand
landingtherelationshipis afactorof three[1]. Thedifferenceis thedirectrelationshipbetween
normalperformanceandtheboundaryfor wheelexcursions,not theCL.
2.9.2 Stand Taxilanes
For the stand taxilanes, all separation distances are slightly reduced from those on taxiways
because of lower taxi speeds. The margins associated with wing tips are indicated in the right-
hand column of Table 4. Similarly, the assumed maximum deviations of the main gear are
reduced [8], and are listed in Table 7. As for taxiways, the 95% performance requirement should
be established with enough margin to these maximums so that the probability of exceeding the
values shown in Table 7 is small. Extension of the philosophy with taxiways places the 95% limit
at one half of the assumed maximums in Table 7, which are also shown in the table.
Table 7. Stand Taxilane Normal Performance Requirement
Relationship to Gear Deviation
Aerodrome Maximum Gear 95% Performance
Code Deviation Requirement
A
(meters)
1.5
B 1.5 0.7
C 2.0 1.0
D 2.5 1.2
E 2.5 1.2
2.9.3 Stand
For the stand, separation distances are reduced even further than those for stand taxilanes. Table
8 shows the margins [8], an assumed maximum-allowed gear deviation and required 95%
performance. The maximum gear deviations and 95% performance requirements are maintained
at the same ratios for each aerodrome code as allowed in the stand taxilane. [t should be noted
that this performance may not be sufficient for parking and docking. The requirements given here
are related only to safety and are probably insufficient to accurately dock an aircraft at the gate.
Table 8. Stand Normal Performance Requirement
Relationship to Wing and Gear Mar_ins
Wing tip mar_n Maximum gear 95% performanceAerodrome
code
A
(meters)
3.0
deviation (meters)
1.0
requirement (meters)
0.5
B 3.0 1.0 0.5
C 4.5 1.5 0.7
D 7.5 2.0 1.0
E 2.07.5 1.0
12
2.9.4 Position Estimation Error Requirements
Referring again to Figure 6, the TSE is composed of Path Definition Error (PDE), Path Steering
Error (PSE) and Position Estimation Error (PEE), represented mathematically as:
Instantaneous RNP accuracy = TSE = PDE + PSE + PEE (1)
PSE is defined as the difference between the defined path and the estimated aircraft position.
PEE is the difference between the actual and estimated positions. PDE is any error in defining the
desired path (survey and database errors etc.). The combination of PEE and PDE has
traditionally been referred to as navigation sensor error (NSE). Since they are statistically
independent, PEE, PSE and PDE are normally Root Sum Squared (RSS'd) together to compute
TSE. It is also always assumed that the pilot or flight control system is attempting to fly the
course provided by the guidance system (ILS, MLS, GNSS). However, this assumption is not
applicable to surface movement. When visibility conditions are such that the pilot is able to track
the actual centerline by visual reference the track defined by the guidance system may be different
from the desired track without any effect on overall performance. In fact, in good visibility the
role of electronic guidance is mainly for enhancing situational awareness. The result is that in
those cases the PEE, PSE and PDE are not additive as in equation 1. It is only under the lowest
visibility conditions (Visibility Condition 4) when the pilot is completely reliant on the guidance
system (as for approach and landing) that the PEE, PSE and PDE would be additive. It is
proposed that these factors be taken into account when allocating accuracy requirements.
Based on the background above, the proposed methodology for deriving PEE is as follows:
1. For Visibility Conditions 1 and 2 (>400 m RVR) the pilot primarily uses visual guidance. The
electronic guidance is mainly for situational awareness. The accuracy required is only that
necessary to allow the pilot to determine on which taxiway he is located. The proposed PEE
is therefore based on the width of the taxiway, which varies according to aerodrome code.
This applies to all taxiways except in the stand areas, since those have no defined width, and
situational awareness should not be a problem in the stand in good visibility.
2. For Visibility Condition 3 (75 - 400 m RVR) the pilot still primarily uses visual guidance. The
electronic guidance could be used for anticipating turns, particularly for implementations with
a head up display. However, the PEE should not be allowed to be too large because the pilot
may lose confidence in the system. The PSE and PEE are therefore recommended to be equal
to the specified TSE. This also allows for visual conditions where the pilot may still use the
electronic guidance, thus ensuring the errors do not exceed the allowed TSE.
3. For Visibility Condition 4 (<75 m RVR) the PSE and PEE are additive and are therefore
RSS'd to compute TSE. The process used in determining the recommended allocations was
based on maximizing the PSE allocation. The PEE was assigned a value equal to 50 percent
of the TSE, and the PSE was assigned the remaining portion on an RSS basis.
Table 9 shows the allocations for rapid exits, normal and apron taxiways for the various airport
categories by aerodrome code. The PEE values were derived using the methodology described
above. All values are based on the largest aircraft type for each aerodrome code. For smaller
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aircraftoperating on aerodromes designed to accommodate larger aircraft the margins go up
accordingly, therefore allowing larger TSE, PSE and PEE. For example, a DC-9 is considered a
code C aircraft and has an outer gear wheel span of 6.0 m. When operating on a code E
aerodrome the wheel margin becomes 8.5 m instead of the minimum of 4.5. This would allow the
TSE to be doubled from 2.2 m to 4.4 m. Assuming a constant for PSE, the PEE for Visibility
Condition 4 (Table 9) could increase from 0.8 m to 4.0 m. The conclusion is that for the smaller
aircraft operating at aerodromes designed to handle the largest aircraft, the increase in safety
margins will allow significantly larger PEE values.
Table 9.
Aerodrome
Code
PEE Allocations For Rapid Exits, Normal, And Apron Taxiways
Visibility 1,2 Visibility 3 Visibility 4
TSE
(95%, m)
PEE
(95%, m)
PSE
(95%, m)
PEE
(95%, m)
PSE
(95%, m)
Taxiway
Width (m)
A 7.5 0.7 7.5 0.7 0.7 0.6
B 10.5 1.1 10.5 1.1 1.1 1.0
C 15 1.5 15 1.5 1.5 1.3
C,D 18 2.2 18 2.2 2.2 1.9
D,E 2,22.2 2.223 1.923
PEE
(95%, m)
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.1
1.1
Technically, we should also account for an allocation of the PDE. The PDE includes errors in the
airport survey or navigation database, which have to be accounted for separately from GNSS or
any guidance sensor. However, assuming these errors are limited to 1 ft (0.3 m) for most cases
this still leaves almost all of the allocated value to the PEE. For example, for Visibility 4 and
Codes D and E the PEE is 1.1 m. When subtracting out 0.3 m (on an RSS basis) for PDE this
still leaves 1.06 m for PEE. Based on an assumption that the PDE is limited to 1 ft, all of the
allocation is made to PEE. Figure 7 summarizes the PEE requirements for Visibility Conditions 3
and 4. Additional validation is required for the allocation process.
E
IU
ttl
el
A B C D E
Aerodrome Code
l OVisibility 3 [[|Visibility 4
Figure 7. Recommended Lateral and Longitudinal PEE (Visibility Condition 3 and 4)
2.10 Availability
Availability is an indication of the ability of the guidance function to provide usable service within
the specified coverage area. Availability is defined as the portion of time the system is to be used
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for navigation. Duringthis timereliablenavigationinformationispresentedto thecrew,
autopilot,or othersystemmanagingthemovementof theaircraft. Availability is specifiedin
termsof theprobabilityof theguidancefunctionbeingavailableat thebeginningof the intended
operation.The availability required for surface movement should not limit the overall operations
of the aerodrome. As an example, for low visibility operations the guidance function should have
at least the same availability as the landing system guidance function, otherwise the total operation
cannot be performed. For providing service in Visibility Conditions 3 and 4, the availability
requirement should be equal to that of an associated Category III landing system and is 0.999.
For Visibility Conditions 1 and 2, the availability is equal to that of an associated non-precision
approach since the pilot can taxi visually, and is 0.95 [5].
3.0 VALIDATION
Several methods are being used to validate the proposed RNP. These include use of operational
data, simulations, field demonstrations, and analysis.
3.1 Operations
Several sources of data were used to validate the accuracy allocations. One source was a
statistical analysis of operational data from London Heathrow Airport consisting of over 77,000
aircraft taxiing movements on the airport surface [8]. Aircraft taxi centerline deviations recorded
for various aircraft in the U.K. study are shown below in Table 10 and correlate well with RNP
requirements. The majority of the 95% values are within the + 2.2 m TSE requirement discussed
in 2.8.1.
Table 10. Taxi Centerline Tracking Performance, Operational Data
Aircraft
Type
A310
Straight Sections
95% (m)
+1.4
Curved Sections
95% (m)
+1.9
B72S +1.4 +1.9
B73S +1.6 _+1.8
B747 +1.2 +2.5
B757 +1.4 +1.8
BACI-11 +1.5 +1.9
DC9S +1.5 +2.3
DC9 +1.4 +2.0
F27 +1.5 +1.9
F28 +4.6 +2.0
$360 +1.4 +1.9
L1011 +1.1 +2.3
Note: Data collected on normal and apron taxiways only.
Data Source: Heathrow Airport operational data [8]
3.2 Simulations
Data from several NASA simulator tests were analyzed, including a Runway Status Light System
(RSLS) evaluation [ 16] and a moving map display study [17, ]8]. For the RSLS evaluation, data
was collected in the Langley Research Center's Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV)
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simulatorduringthe summerof 1994. Twenty-one test subjects piloted a simulated Boeing 737
aircraft along ten different routes during various visibility conditions at Denver Stapleton Airport.
This data was not originally collected to measure aircraft deviations from the centerline.
However, since the data collected included aircraft position at discrete intervals, this data could be
used to evaluate the aircraft's position throughout the taxiing phase. The data provided a unique
look at how closely aircraft crews follow the centerline in an actual operating environment with
their heads up.
For the moving map display study, NASA's TSRV simulator was again used to verify the
performance of electronic maps in the cockpit. Fourteen pilots performed simulated taxiing runs
along four different routes and two visibility conditions using two different types of map displays -
a paper map and an electronic map. The deviation of the aircraft center-of-gravity (CG), which is
located 37 feet behind the aircratt nose, was measured from the taxiway centerline. Centerline
deviations collected from the RSLS simulation study (Table 11) are consistent with the Heathrow
Airport data (see Table 10). However, the moving map study showed straight section 95%
centerline deviations significantly greater than the others. The results indicate the limitation in the
capability to taxi with only the map for guidance.
Table 11. Summary of Aircraft Taxi Centedine Tracking Performance, Simulation Data
Aircraft
Type
B737
Straight Sections
95% (m)
+1.4
B737 _+1.2
B737 _+1.5
B737 +1.5
Curved Sections
95% (m)
N/A
N/A
Data Source
1. VFR/day
N/A
N/A 1. RVR 600'
2. VFR
1.VFR/night
1. RVR 1200'
B737 _+3.9 _+6.8
B737 +3.7 _+6.2 2. RVR 150'
B737
_+3.9
B737 +3.7
-+5.2 2. VFR with map
_+5.0 2. RVR 150' with map
Note: Data collected on normal and apron taxiways only.
Data Sources:
1. RSLS simulator data [161
2. Moving map display simulator data [17.18]
3.3 Field Demonstrations
Field data was collected during the NASA LVLASO demonstration at Hartsfield Atlanta Airport
in August 1997. These test were conducted with various configurations of the LVLASO cockpit
displays, consisting of a Head Up Display (HUD) and moving map. The results (Table 12) are
consistent with the other operational data, and are also well within the proposed RNP.
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Table 12. Taxi Centerline Tracking Performance, NASA Demonstration Data
Aircraft 95% (m) Test Conditions
B757 +1.3 HUD and Moving Map
B757 +1.3 HUD, No Moving Map
B757 +1.6 Movin8 Map, No HUD
B757 +1.6 No Moving Map, No HUD
The same field test was used to analyze the performance of local area differential GPS on the
airport surface. The results indicated horizontal position errors of approximately 1.6 m (95%)
[32]. This meets the position estimation error requirements for visibility 3 for most airports (2.2
m), and comes close to meeting the proposed requirement for visibility 4 (1.1 m).
3.4 Analysis
3.4.1 Pilot Failure Risk Analysis
3.4.1.1 Introduction
The purpose of the pilot failure risk analysis is to validate the pilot risk factor component of the
RNP. This section will detail the analysis of the individual failure modes for several different
scenarios that may occur on the airport surface. The pilot risk will then be associated with these
scenarios according to the required response time to avoid an incident. As depicted in Figure 2,
the total incident risk is comprised of both detected and undetected failures and therefore both
failure modes must be examined.
3.4.1.2 Assumptions
To analyze the pilot failure risk, several assumptions were made including the failure mode
experienced, the visibility condition, the cockpit display equipment, the number of crew members
and their respective roles, and the aircraft velocity. Failure modes analyzed include continuity and
integrity. A warning or signal will be given to the aircraft crew immediately upon a continuity
failure. An integrity failure will yield no warning, therefore the crew will depend on visual cues to
recognize that a failure has occurred. Consequently, longer response times can be expected for
integrity failures. Since the crew relies on visual, out-the-window views, visibility will primarily
drive pilot risk for the integrity failure mode. The three visibility conditions considered are
described in 2.3.
As part of the NASA LVLASO (Low Visibility Landing And Surface Operations) program,
additional cockpit display equipment will be available to assist the crew in low visibility
conditions. This equipment includes a Head-Up Display (HUD) [20] which will display traffic
cones outlining runways and taxiways, signs showing the pilot which way to turn, and other data
pertinent to the operation of the aircraft (speed, heading, altitude, etc.). A Head-Down Display
(HDD) will be available for either the pilot-in-command or co-pilot's use. This display will
contain a map of the airport surface that shows location of own aircrat_, other aircraft, airport
runway/taxiway/gate area locations, and the preferred surface route for the aircraft to follow.
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Theavailabilityof thiscockpit displayequipmentledto assumptionsregardingcrewnumbersand
roles. For Visibility Condition1,2,it wasassumedthat onlyonepilot wouldbepresentin the
cockpit. Underthis visibility conditionthepilot shouldbeableto monitorthe HDD for situational
awarenessandguidetheaircraftusingexternalvisualcues. However,underVisibilityConditions
3 and4, it wasassumedthat bothapilot-in-commandandaco-pilot wouldbe required.The
pilot-in-commandwouldberesponsiblefor monitoringthe"out-the-window"view with theHUD
availablefor additionalguidance.Theco-pilot wouldberesponsiblefor monitoringtheHDD and
providingverbalfeedbackto thepilot-in-commandon runway/taxiwaylocation,otheraircraft
locations,andmaintainingconformanceto thedesignatedroute.
Theaircraftvelocitywhenafailureoccurswill affecttheamountof timethecrewhasto respond
to thefailure. Thegreatertheaircraftvelocity,the longerthebrakingdistance,andconsequently,
the lesstimeavailablefor thecrewto.respond.Crewresponsemayalsobelongerbecauseof an
increasedcrewworkloadwhentravelingat highspeedsontheairport surface(e.g.,highspeed
exit taxiing). Aircraft speedsassumedfor variousscenariosaregivenin Table1. Eachscenario
wasanalyzedfor nominalandworstcaseaircraftvelocity,shownin Table13. Differentspeeds
werechosenfor the normal/aprontaxi phasefor thetwo failuremodes,becauseof thenatureof
eachscenario.Lower speedswereusedfor thecominuityfailuredueto the90° turn associated
with this scenario.The scenarios will be discussed in more depth in the following section.
Furthermore, worst case speeds were analyzed only under dry surface conditions and Visibility
1,2. It was determined that aircraft would probably not operate at these higher speeds under wet
airport surface conditions and/or reduced visibility. Conversely, scenarios under Visibility
Conditions 3 and 4 were analyzed at nominal speeds and wet airport surface conditions.
Table 13.
High Speed
Normal/Apron Speed (Continuity)
Normal/Apron Speed (Integrity)
Stand Taxilane
Aircraft Speeds
Nominal (kts.)
30
10
20
Worst Case (kts.)
50
20
30
10
3.4.1.3 Analytical Scenarios
To analyze the pilot risk factor, several scenarios were created to simulate a possible "real-world"
situation that may occur while an aircraft is taxiing on the airport surface. These scenarios are
based on observations made at airports with typical taxiing procedures. The navigation errors
encountered were chosen to occur at the worst possible time in an attempt to build some
conservatism into the results. Scenarios were created for both continuity and integrity failure
modes. Furthermore, each failure mode was analyzed at three different phases of taxiing: high
speed, normal, and stand taxilane.
3.4.1.3.1 Continuity Failure Scenarios
The continuity failure scenario is based on an aircraft making a turn from the runway to the
taxiway. At the midpoint of the turn the navigation system fails and the crew is given a warning.
The crew is instructed to bring the aircratt to an immediate stop. At the point of failure it is
assumed the aircraft continues in a straight line as the crew responds to the failure and begins
braking. This straight line assumption minimizes the distance between the failure location and the
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nearestpossibleobjectasdefinedbythe ICAO AerodromeDesignManualfor CodeE aircraft
[8]. By minimizingthisdistance,themostcritical scenariois chosen.A depictionof this scenario
is shownin Figure8 for normaltaxi andin Figure9 for highspeedtaxi.
Figure 8. Continuity FaiLure During Normal Taxi
Note - Stand Taxilane scenario is similar, but distance from Centerline to Object is 42.5 m.
Figure 9. Continuity Failure During High Speed Taxi
3.4.1.3.2 Integrity Failure Scenarios
The integrity failure scenario is based on an aircraft taxiing along a straight section of runway
when it encounters a 20 meter waypoint error in the navigation route. Since this error is
undetected by the system, no warning or alert is provided to the crew. With no warning or alert,
the crew must recognize that a failure has occurred and begin immediate braking of the aircraft to
avoid running off the pavement. A 20 meter waypoint error was chosen to represent the largest
error that may be possible without becoming obvious to the crew taxiing along a typical 46 meter
wide runway. Waypoint errors of this size on a taxiway would presumably be more readily
detectable to the crew due to the much smaller width of the taxiway (23 meters). A more
reasonable waypoint error for the taxiways would be 10 meters and result in twice the distance
before the aircraft left the pavement. Therefore, the runway was analyzed, because it presented a
more demanding scenario with shorter distances to incident than taxiing along a taxiway. For the
normal taxi phase, the distance chosen (300 m) for the error to occur is based on the average
segment length of an aircraft's taxi route at Atlanta Hartsfield airport and Denver Stapleton
airport. For the high speed taxi phase, the distance (344 m) is based on the spacing between high
speed exits at Atlanta Hartsfield airport. Figures 10 and 11 below illustrate scenarios for normal
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andhighspeedtaxiphasesrespectively.In bothscenarios,theairplanewas assumed to be offthe
pavement when the aircraft nose was 15 meters from the runway centerline.
I. 3oom _1
Tm
Figure 10. Integrity Failure During Normal Taxi
.._ L. 344m _1
............ ......
- .___Z_ "' ,. 258 rn _ a. _," Waypoint Error
Figure 11. Integrity Failure During High Speed Taxi
The stand taxilane scenario is similar to the integrity failure during normal taxi phase (Figure 10)
except the waypoint error is only 10 meters due to the tighter spacing within the gate area. The
distance the aircraft is from the erroneous waypoint was set at 52 meters to represent typical gate
spacing at Atlanta Hartsfield airport. Table 14 summarizes the Distance to Incident (di) for each
of the scenarios described above.
Table 14. Distance to Incident
Taxi Phase
Hi[h Speed
Normal/Apron
Stand Taxilane
Distance to Incident (m)
Failure Mode
Continuity
286
72 225
66
Integrity
258
52
3.4.1.4 Response Times
3.4.1.4.1 Aircraft Crew Response Times
The average aircraft crew response times to the various modes of failure were determined by
researching existing relevant human factors studies. Appendix C summarizes the studies used.
Under a continuity failure, the crew is reacting to either a visual or audio warning from within the
cockpit and relatively short response times can be expected. For integrity failures, the crew is
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reacting to a visual reference that is either an "out-the-window" view or the view obtained from
the cockpit mounted HDD. Because the crew is relying predominately on the "out-the-window"
view, longer response times can be expected with decreasing visibility. Figure 12 summarizes the
crew response times assumed for this study.
5
4.5
4
3.5
o
_-_ 2.5
O
_E 2
I--
1.5
0.5
O Stand Taxilane
l Normal/Apron
Continuity, Integrity, Integrity, _egrity,
All Vis. Vis. 1,2 Vis. 3 Vis. 4
Failure Mode, Visibility Condition
Figure 12. Aircraft Crew Mean Response Times
The times shown above represent the time required by the crew to initiate aircraft braking. Under
all failure modes, the crew's response is to begin an immediate, hard/panic stop of the aircraft.
Further validation of these response times should be performed through aircraft simulator testing
using these emergency conditions. Appendix D describes the method used to correlate pilot
response times with the risk of a pilot failing to respond in time to a failure (pilot risk). It was
assumed that pilot response time could be modeled with a normal probability distribution. A
value of one second was chosen for o for continuity failures in all visibilities. This value is
consistent with pilot reaction times to TCAS resolution advisories [21 ]. For integrity failures, it
was assumed that visibility will affect reaction times. For degraded visibilities (Visibility
Conditions 3 and 4), standard deviation was set equal to the mean response time (Figure 12).
These values are consistent with studies conducted for pilot reaction times to more complex
situations than an auditory alarm [22, 26].
3.4.1.4.2 Aircraft Response Times
The response time of the aircraft is that time required to bring the aircrai_ to a complete stop once
the crew initiates braking. Maximum deceleration rates for the Boeing 747-400 were obtained
from Boeing and used to calculate the braking distance. A firm, comfortable rate of 6 it/sec 2 (.2g)
was analyzed, as well as a hard, panic stop of 12 ft./sec 2 (.4g). Because of the shorter stopping
distances, the .4g hard, panic stop was chosen for this analysis. The 747 was chosen to establish a
worst case scenario. Most other aircraft will have shorter braking distances. Aircraft braking was
analyzed under wet and dry airport surface conditions. Under wet runway conditions, aircraft
21
stoppingdistancesbecomelongerbecauseof the decreased coefficient of friction of the airport
surface. Consequently, after a failure occurs under wet conditions, more time will be needed to
brake the aircraft and less time will be available for the crew to respond. As stated under the
assumptions in 3.4. 1.2, wet conditions were assumed under Visibility Conditions 3 and 4 and only
at nominal speeds.
Once braking distances were obtained, the maximum amount of time the crew had to respond to
the failure was determined. This is simply the aircraft braking distance subtracted from the
distance to the incident (di) divided by the aircraft velocity when the failure occurred. Subtracted
out of this total was an additional. 75 seconds that is required on the 747-400 to engage the brake
pistons once braking action is applied. Refer to Appendix D for a detailed discussion of the
mathematics.
3.4.1.4.3 Response Time Summary
The assumptions made in this analysis and the corresponding results are contained in Table 14.
Based on runway conditions, aircratt braking distance, maximum time for crew to respond, and
the "extra time" for the crew to respond were calculated. This calculated "extra time" to respond
represents the excess time the crew has to respond to the failure, which in turn determines the
pilot failure risk.
3.4.1.5 Pilot Failure Risk
Several factors must be taken into account when calculating pilot failure risk. The total pilot
failure risk consists of essentially four components: the relative exposure for the failure condition,
the reaction time distribution, the aircraft speed distribution, and the airport surface condition.
These four factors are illustrated Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Pilot Risk Tree
The relative amount of exposure time the aircraft spends in a turn could be used to more
accurately determine the probability of the failure occurring in the turn. To go one step further,
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the amount of exposure time the aircraft spends at the turn's apex (where continuity failure was
assumed in this analysis) could be added into the total pilot risk calculation. This study did not
factor in this probability, because of the lack of any substantial data collected to quantify this
variable.
Reaction time distribution was the primary factor analyzed in this study to determine pilot failure
risk. Based on the previously discussed scenarios and corresponding assumptions, the crew's
excess time to respond to the failure was calculated. Once excess time was determined for each
scenario, the probability of the crew response time exceeding this time could be modeled with a
normal probability distribution. Appendix D contains a detailed discussion of this analysis.
The probability of the aircraft being at the worst case speed when the failure occurs can also be
used to refine the calculations. In this analysis, this probability was factored into the calculation
of the pilot failure risk for the continuity failure scenarios where the aircraft is in the stand taxilane
and normal/apron phase of taxiing. It was assumed that aircratt speeds on the airport surface
could be approximated by a normal probability distribution and the worst case speed represents
two standard deviations of this distribution (20). This 20 value equates to the aircraft traveling at
worst case speeds or greater 5% of the time. Finally, the probability that worse case surface
conditions will exist were indirectly taken into account in this study. As stated in the assumptions
in 3.4.1.2, aircraft will probably operate under wet airport surface conditions under Visibilities 3
and 4, but only at nominal speeds. At Visibility Conditions 1,2, operations were assumed to take
place on a dry surface, but at worst case speeds. Ice and snow covered surface conditions were
not evaluated in this analysis.
Based on our analysis of the previously mentioned scenarios, the proposed pilot failure risks were
conservative in their estimates for all but three scenarios. It was determined for these scenarios
that the proposed pilot risks were too low and should be increased. These three scenarios are:
1. Visibility Condition 1,2, normal/apron taxi phase, continuity failure mode,
2. Visibility Condition 1,2, high speed taxi phase, integrity failure mode,
3. Visibility Condition 3, high speed taxi phase, integrity failure mode.
Of these three only the first two changed the previously proposed requirement. These changes
resulted in a modification to the continuity and integrity specified risk for visibility condition 1,2.
The allocated risk for continuity, Visibility Condition 1,2 decreased from 6.0 x 10 -s to 3.0 x 10s.
The allocated risk for integrity, Visibility Condition 1,2 decreased from 3.0 x 10 -3 to 2.0 x 10-4,
roughly an order of magnitude. The validated pilot risk allocations and the validation analysis
results for each scenario are presented in Table 15. The pilot risk allocations are also listed in
Table 2 and graphed in Figure 3.
3.4.2 Functional Hazard Assessment
The failure mode analysis demonstrated close correlation with the aircraft system design standards
contained in Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 25-1309, FAA Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A
[24] and Joint Aviation Requirement (JAR) 25 [25]. These standards relate the consequences and
severity of effects of system failures and required probabilities. Table 16 shows these
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relationshipsandTable17showshowthesecompareto themoststringentsurfacemovementrisk
requirements.Most casesfall within theminorcategorywhichrequiresafailureratebetween10.3
and l04 perhour. Theonly exceptionis Visibility Condition4 integritywhichis classifiedas
Major, with a failureratebetween10.5and l0-7. Overall,thefailureconditioneffectsassociated
with the surfacemovementfailuremodesareconsistentwith thecategoriesdefinedbytheFAR
andJAR requirements.It shouldbenotedthat thiscomparisoncanonlyvalidatethatfailure
probabilitiesarewithin the right failureclassificationrange,or roughlytwo ordersof magnitude.
3.4.3 Further Validation
Due to limited data available to date, it is recommended that additional data be collected to
further substantiate the proposed RNP requirements presented herein. Additional simulator
testing should be conducted to verify the pilot reaction times to the various failures assumed in the
pilot failure risk analysis. Further verification of the achieved accuracy performance should be
conducted with additional simulator and field testing. These tests should be performed under the
visibility conditions specified in this report in an attempt to recreate the scenarios analyzed.
Naturally, varying visibilities will be easier to control under simulator conditions, but night
conditions could be used during the field testing.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Use of RNP for all phases of flight is accepted by the aviation community, in the U.S. and
internationally. The approach and landing RNP has pioneered the process and analytical
techniques used to define aviation standards and requirements for accuracy, continuity, integrity,
and availability. Application of the RNP described in this report to the runway surface has used
the same process, but for a two-dimensional surface with unique navigation requirements. For the
surface RNP, work to date has focused on the analytical aspects of the process, the classification
of operations, the allocation of risks to each operational phase, and the calculation of containment
limits, integrity and continuity requirements. Operational and simulator data have been used to
validate the analyses; however, validation in some areas is limited, and further simulation and field
trials are required. The process and data used to develop the surface RNP have been coordinated
with aviation standards organizations including ICAO All Weather Operations Panel and RTCA.
RTCA is in the process of developing requirements for airport surface navigation and
surveillance. The RNP requirements presented in this paper can be a primary input to the
navigation requirements. The following summarize the key RNP requirements.
• Target Level of Safety - 1.0 x l0 "s fatal taxi accidents per operation.
• Integrity and Continuity Risk (per hour):
Inte_rity
Continuity
Visibility Condition
1,2 3 4
2.0x10 .4 3.0x10 -5 3.0x10 .6
3.0 x 10.3 3.0 x 10-3 1.5 x 10 -3
• Containment Limits (aerodrome codes D and E) - 15 m for taxiways, 10 m for stand
taxilanes, 7.5 m for stand areas.
• Normal Performance Requirements (aerodrome codes D and E) - 2.2 m for taxiways,
1.2 m for stand taxilanes, 1.0 m for stand areas.
ICAO, FAA and RTCA are all currently developing requirements for local area differential GNSS
to support Category I, II, and III approach and landing. It is intended that local area navigation
systems be capable of supporting surface operations. The requirements described in this report
should be considered in the development of local area differential GNSS standards to be sure that
these systems will adequately support surface operations. It is recommended that further
simulator studies and field studies be conducted to validate the proposed RNP. Specifically,
simulator studies are recommended to characterize crew reaction to failures, while simulator and
field tests are recommended to validate achieved accuracy performance. This should also include
an evaluation of the magnitude of acceptable Position Estimation Errors for moving map and
HUD applications under various visibility conditions.
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ACRONYMS
A-SMGCS - Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems
ATIDS - Airport Surface Target Identification System
AWOP - All Weather Operations Panel
CG - Center-of-Gravity
CL - Containment Limit
DGPS - Differential Global Positioning System
FAR - Federal Aviation Regulation
GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems
GPS - Global Positioning System
HDD - Head-Down Display
HUD - Head-Up Display
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
ILS - Instrument Landing System
JAR - Joint Aviation Requirement
LVLASO - Low Visibility Landing And Surface Operations
MASPS - Minimum Aviation Systems Performance Standard
MLS - Microwave Landing System
NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
PDE - Path Definition Error
PEE - Position Estimation Error
PSE - Path Steering Error
RNP - Required Navigation Performance
RSLS - Runway Status Light System
RSS - Root Sum Square
RVR - Runway Visual Range
SSR - Secondary Surveillance Radar
TCAS - Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TLS - Target Level of Safety
TSE - Total System Error
TSRV - Transport Systems Research Vehicle
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APPENDIX A
TAXI SPEED ANALYSIS
A1 DEFINITION OF SURFACE MOVEMENT RNP TAXI SPEEDS
A1.1 Atlanta Hartsfield Data
Taxi data from Atlanta was gathered using the experimental Airport Surface Target Identification
System (ATIDS). ATIDS is a multilateration system that receives Secondary Surveillance Radar
(SSR) transmissions and triangulates, or multilaterates, from several receiver locations to
determine the location of an SSR transponder. It is designed to work with aircraft equipped with
Mode A/C and S transponders. All of the data used in the analysis presented here are from Mode
S equipped aircraft.
The data available from Atlanta is used here primarily to evaluate velocities on high speed
taxiways. The average velocity of the plane in that region, as well as its maximum and minimum
velocities, were evaluated. For the high speed exits, as at Atlanta (Figure A1), the maximum
velocity normally corresponds to the speed at which the plane exits the runway, and the minimum
velocity usually corresponds to termination of the high speed exit phase. Examination of the data
reveals that some aircraft will slow down and then accelerate to a faster speed, therefore it cannot
be assumed that all aircraft constantly decelerate.
For Atlanta Airport, the maximum, minimum and average velocities were calculated for each
aircraft exiting at one of the high speed exits, exit B11 (Figure A2). Tables A1 and A2 summarize
the calculations and are grouped according to aircraf_ type. Since the B 11 exit was used most
often, estimates there are more statistically significant than for the B7 exit. For the B11 exit, the
maximum velocity for any aircraft was 60 knots, with only three having maximums greater than
50 knots. The minimum velocity was 13.2 knots and the overall average velocity was 31.7 knots.
For the B2 exit, the maximum velocity was 48.1 knots, the minimum velocity was 15.1 knots, and
the average velocity was 29.4 knots. Figures A3 and A4 illustrate typical velocities measured for
aircraft using both the normal and high speed runway exits and subsequent taxi to the apron areas.
There is not sufficient data available for a statistical analysis of taxi speeds on normal taxiways.
The main reason is due to current procedures, where transponders are switched off immediately
after landing and prior to arrivals in the gate area.
A1.2 London Heathrow Data
The second set of data came from London Heathrow Airport [6]. Figures A5 and A6 summarize
results as bar charts. For the outer curve the average velocity was 164 knots and the 95% values
are all less than 24 knots. The maximum velocity for any aircraft was 33 knots, with all others
being less than 30 knots. However, this data was collected on a more shallow curve
(approximately 60 °) than the taxiway turn for which the taxi speed range was established in Table
l (90°), so a direct comparison cannot be made. For the straight section, the average velocity
was 16.9 knots and the 95% values are all less than 27 knots. The maximum velocity for any
aircraft was 49 knots, with the maximum for most being slightly over 30 knots.
A1.3 Conclusion
Based on this analysis, the range of taxi speeds for the various phases are as shown in Table 1 of
the report.
A-2
High Speed Exits
i 1000ft
Figure AI. Atlanta Hartsfieid Airport Layout (North End)
B7
Bll
........................ J
610fl 540 fi
Figure A2. Atlanta Runway 8L High Speed Exits - Regions Defined for Velocity
Evaluation
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Aircraft T_Te
727
I
Taxiwav
BII
Ave. Vet _kts_
31.7
Max Vet _kts)
42.5
Min Vet _kts)
25.3
727 B11 33.5 44.9 30.5
727 BI 1 29.2 35.3 24.8
727 total average
737 BI 1
737 BI 1
737 Bll
737 Bi 1
737 total average
757 B 11
757
31.5
II
27.3 37 21.6
22.7 31.4 13.7
26.8 24.3 26
32.5 37.7 29.2
27.3
28.2 31.7 13.2
35.6 41.4 23.5
31.9
31
757 total average
767
Bll ,
BII 34.4 27.9
767 B11 26.9 32.2 21.2
767 B11 29.6 35 26.3
757 total avera[e 29.2
DC9 B11 27 32.7 17.2
L-1011 Bll 28 38.6 13.9
MD-88 BI 1 31.4 34.3 29.7
MD-88 BI 1 44.6 57.1 38.6
MD-88 Bi i 31.4 38.2 30.2
MD-88 BI 1 38.3 40.6 35.6
Bll 41.7 60 37.6MD-88
MD-88 B11 27.3 39.7 23.7
MD-S8 B11 36.6 33.9 36.4
MD-88 BII 34.1 36.5 32.3
MD-88 B 11 40 46.5 31. I
MD-88 total average 36.2
tmknown B11 23 26.6 18.6
unknown B11 30.2 42.6 18.1
BIItlllkno_
Overall Average
Table A1.
50.5
60
35.9
31.7
u/iknown
13.2
Atlanta High Speed Exit BI 1 Velocity Data
Aircraft T_e
727
Taxiwa_'
B2
Ave. Vel ,_kt$_
35.4
Max Vet {kts t
38.1
Min Vel _kts)
32.9
727 B2 20.3 27.9 19.4
727 total avera[e 27.85
737 B2 34.8 36.9 29.7
737 132 21 38.4 16.3
737 total average , 27.9
757 B2 38.7 404 34.9
767 B2 24.4 28.5 18.9
DC-9 B2 29.2 40.1 15.1
DC-9 B2 20.1 25.1 18.1
24.65
36.5
33.2
29.4
DC-9 total average
MD-88 B2 48.1 31.9
B2 40.1 29.9
Overall Average 48.1 ! 5.1
Table A2. Atlanta High Speed Exit B2 Velocity Data
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APPENDIX B
EXPOSURE TIME ANALYSIS
B1 DEFINITION OF SURFACE MOVEMENT RNP EXPOSURE TIMES
For each phase of aircra_ surface movement (high speed taxi, normal taxi, apron) a risk of failure
associated with each RNP function (integrity and continuity) is calculated given various visibility
conditions. A risk rate (risk/time) can be determined by estimating the exposure time for each
phase of surface movement.
B1.1 Normal Taxi and Apron Exposure Time Calculation
This section estimates exposure times during the three phases of taxiing at various international
U.S. airports. To calculate exposure times for normal taxi and apron maneuvers, taxi phase
velocities were assumed to be 20 knots and 5 knots for normal taxi and apron, respectively. Three
cases were examined: worst case, and two average taxiing run cases. Taxiing distances were
measured from airport schematics with proper scaling. The worst case scenarios were assumed to
have the longest normal taxi and (possibly) apron distances. The nominal cases were assumed to
have average distances from two major runways to a centrally located terminal. Results are
shown in Table B 1, and the taxiing routes for each airport are shown in Figures B 1 through B9.
B1.2 High Speed Taxi Exposure Time Calculation
Taxi data from Atlanta was gathered using the experimental ATIDS. Data on aircratt landing on
runway 8L at Atlanta Airport and exiting onto high speed taxiway B 11 were analyzed. Landing
and taxiing data were segregated to include only high speed taxi data. The segregation followed
two criteria. First, the data used must have fallen within specific boundaries imposed on the
taxiway. Second, once the aircratt entered this boundary, the first data point where velocity
reduced below the assumed high speed taxi maximum (60 kts) became the first segregation point.
Searching the data from the exit termination backwards, the first data point that was larger than
the high speed taxi minimum was declared the second segregation point. All data between these
two points were used for exposure time calculation (even though some data were outside the
velocity bounds). In addition, boundary dimensions were chosen to include data that might be
slightly outside the high speed taxi exit but still be within the velocity bounds (30 knots < V < 60
knots).
High speed taxi velocities were calculated using three different methods (see Figure B 10). The
first (I) involved numerically integrating the curve-fitted line length over velocity functions from
data gathered at Atlanta Airport. The average exposure time was found by taking the mean of all
individual exposure times calculated. The second method (II) again used fitted functions of the
position and velocity. Mean values of second-degree interpolation coefficients were used for an
average line-length over velocity integration yielding an average exposure time. The final method
(III) used the mean log time of all runs from the Atlanta data as the average exposure time.
Figure B 11 shows a histogram of the number of aircratt within time ranges of 10-20 seconds, 20-
30 seconds and greater than 30 seconds, and Table B2 lists the average exposure times calculated
by the three methods.
B-2
B1.3 Conclusions
The results of the study indicate that for high speed taxi, the maximum exposure time (worst case
scenario) is around 20 seconds. It is reasonable to assume that this does not vary significantly for
different runways. Therefore, it is recommended that the exposure time be specified at 30
seconds, placing an upper bound on the value. For normal taxi, the maximums were found to be
approximately 6 minutes, with the average taxi routes being approximately 3 minutes. The
majority of scenarios will be significantly less than 6 minutes, but is difficult to quantify due to the
large variation in taxi routes possible. The recommendation is to define the exposure time to be 6
minutes, on the assumption that this value encompasses 95% of all cases. For the apron phase,
the maximums were found to be approximately 3 minutes, with the average at 2.5 minutes. Using
reasoning as stated for normal taxi, it is recommended that the exposure time be defined at 3
minutes.
B-3
Facility
ATL
BOS
DEN
DFW
IAD
a-FK
LAX
ORD
SEA
Taxi Phase
Normal (20 las /
Apron (5 ks)
Normal(20_)
Apron (5 kts)
Normal (20 kts)
Apron (5 kts)
Normal (20 kts)
Apron (5 kts)
Normal (20 las)
Apron ( 5 kts)
Normal (20 kts)
Apron (5 _)
Normal (20 kts)
Apron(5kts)
Normal (20 kts)
Apron (5kts) ,.
Normal (20 kts)
Apron (5 kts)
Worst Case
Time (rain)
5.4
Distance
_ft)
10943
Nominal 1
Time (min)
2.66
Distance (ft) Nominal 2
T!me (min)
2.385377
4.29 2170 2.79 1415 2.79 1415
129006.4 1.5
1.60.9
30O0
796460
9.4 19000 6.3 1300
1.1 559 1.5 745
3.8 7700 1.7 3400
4.2 2100 1.7 860
6.5 13100 5.3 10700
8.3 4200 4.9 2500
8.1 16500 3.4 6800
3.7 1900 4.9 2500
2.2
2.1
101005.0
1.6
4500
1000800
6.9 1400 2.9 5800
2.3 1100 2.0 1000
3.8 7700 2.6 5200
3.2 1600 1.0 480
2.1
2.4
Distance
(rt)
4811
4200
1200
5.8 11700
1.5 745
2.6 5400
1.7 860
3.0 6000
4.5 2300
1.0 2000
1.9 980
3.0
1.9
6200
960
{Averages[ Normal (20 kts) ] 6,1Apron (5 kts) 3.3
2.8 5700
2.0 1000
0.3 600
3.9 2000
11038.1I Nom l 2[ 29 I5i650[1654.3 Averages 2.5 1245.0
Table BI. Taxi Phase Exposure Time and Route Distances for Various U.S. Airports
Method
I
II 13.0
III 14.0
Exposure Time
(sec)
20.7
Table B2. High-Speed Taxi Exposure Times
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Figure B1. Schematic of Atlanta International Airport (ATL) Showing Worst Case and
Nominal Taxi Routes
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Schematic of Boston-Logan InternationalAirport (BOS) Showing Worst Case
and Nominal Taxi Routes
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Figure B3. Schematic of Denver International Airport (DEN) Showing Worst Case and
Nominal Taxi Routes
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Figure B4. Schematic of Dallas-Fort Worth IntcrnationalAirport (DFW) Showing Worst
Case and Nominal Taxi Routcs
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Figure B5. Schematic of Dulles International Airport (IAD) Showing Worst Case
and Nominal Taxi Routes
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Figure B6.
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Schematic of John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) Showing Worst
Case and Nominal Taxi Routes
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Figure B7. Schematic of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Showing Worst Case
and Nominal Taxi Routes
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Figure B8. Schematic of Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) Showing Worst
Case and Nominal Taxi Routes
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Figure B9. Schematic of Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA) Showing Worst Case
and Nominal Taxi Routes
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APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF REACTION TIME STUDIES
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APPENDIX D
CALCULATION OF PILOT FAILURE RISK
To validate the pilot failure risk, the probability that an aircraft crew would exceed an allotted
time to respond to an integrity or continuity failure was investigated. The following variables and
equations were used to solve for this probability.
Variables defined:
ttotal time elapsed from when the failure occurs to when the aircraft leaves the pavement
or impacts an object
di total distance from where the failure occurs to an object or the runway edge
(Section 3.4.1.3)
t_ = t_¢o_ + t_ct where t,_o_c is the time it takes for the pilot to identify a failure
and trcact is the time required for the pilot to physically react to the failure. Pilot
reaction time (t,_¢t) is a measure of the pilots muscular reaction time and was
assumed to be 0.5 seconds for each case. This is consistent with human response
studies conducted with aircraft midair collision avoidance and automobile collision
avoidance reaction times [28, 29]. Time to recognize (t_omi_o) will vary with
visibility and speed (workload). Table D1 lists the assumed values for t,_po_a for
the various scenarios and visibility levels.
tbrake time elapsed from initiation of braking until the aircraft comes to a stop
dbrake total distance traveled from initiation of braking until the aircraft comes to a stop
tcxtra the amount of safety margin the pilot has before the aircraft leaves the pavement or
impacts an object if the pilot were to respond in the assumed amount of time in
table D 1
tRM.ax maximum time for the crew to respond (t,_q,o_ + t_,t_)
a deceleration rate of aircraft (-12 l°dsec 2)
Taxi Phase
Vis 4
Average Crew,Response Times (see.)
Continuity Integrity
All Visibilities Vis 1,2 Vis 3
3 3 4
2 2 3
1 2 2
High Speed 5
Normal 4
Stand 3
Table DI. Average Crew Response Times (t._po.d)
D-2
I 1,11
d_re_¢
•_ Moving i
_ircraft I
i i i
Failure Occurs
at t_
time to L_o_.,_, t_,,o..
Stopped
Aia'craft
Y
t_v_, d t_,_
Figure DI. Relationship Between Variables
The maximum hard, panic stopping deceleration rate of-12 fi/sec 2 for the Boeing 747-400 was
used. The time to stop the aircraft (thee) can then be solved with the following equations:
Vr_l = Viniti.l + a*tb_kc = 0 (D-l)
solving for t_k_:
Win-,
t _._,c - (D-2)
a
Braking distance can now be solved for:
dbrake = (Vinitial*tbrake + _,_*a*tbrake2) * gfaetor (D-3)
where the lafa¢_ is the ratio of friction coefficients of dry pavement to wet (if applicable).
Now, the maximum time the crew has to respond, tm_u,, (t_,,_ + tripodal), can be solved for:
t_x - 0.75 (D-4)
where 0.75 is the time for the brake piston stacks to engage.
Next, the following relationship can be written between the various times:
ttotal = t_pond + tbrak= + t°_ (D-5)
D-3
t,o_ = tbrake + tR_ (D-6)
substituting ttotal (equation D-6) into equation D-5 and solving for t,_-, yields:
tcxtn= tRMax " tr_lxmd (D-7)
Now the relationship between _ and pilot risk is established. The probability of the pilot
exceeding t_ was solved for by assuming pilot response times may be modeled with a normal
probability distribution. The probability that t_xt_ will be exceeded is equal to the area under the
normal probability curve from tcx_ to _ (Figure D2).
\\
\
•Figure D2. Probability of Exceeding t,,_t,.,
The normal probability function [30] is given by:
1 2
f(x)- (D-8)
where a is the standard deviation and _ is the mean of the distribution.
The area under the curve can be solved for by integrating f(x) from t_,_ to oo. More simply, this
same area can be solved for by integrating f(x) from ta to t¢_t_ and subtracting from the total area
under the curve. The total area under halfofa normal distribution is equal to %. In equation
form, the probability is given by:
1 _,- 1 -½t(_-*-_,)/_l:
P(t"_' _t' a) = i- J"_ 24242_ e (D-9)
The integral is not explicitly solvable, but can be approximated to a high degree of accuracy with
numerical methods. In this case, the Romberg numerical integration technique [31 ] was used.
The input values for o and _t were selected as follows. In all cases the probability curves are
centered at t = 0, therefore the mean value, _t, is always equal to zero. This is because the
probability being investigated is the probability of a pilot exceeding the average response time
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